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Abstract: We present and discuss a series of experiments designed to test one of the most promising pragmatic 
accounts of conditional perfection—the phenomenon according to which conditionals can sometimes be 
strengthened to biconditionals. We test the idea that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification 
triggered by the kind of question that the conditional is used to answer. We uncover evidence that conditional 
perfection is a form of exhaustification, but not that it is triggered by a relationship to a salient question.  
 
[Word Count (including everything but the abstract): 9830 words] 
1. Introduction 
 
Conditional claims like (1) can, in the right context, convey additional information—the 
sort of information carried by (2) or (3): 
 
(1) If she turns in the final paper, she will pass the class.  
(2) Only if she turns in the final paper, will she pass the class.  
(3) If she does not turn in the final paper, she will not pass the class.  
 
More generally, in the appropriate contexts, from an utterance of If A, B hearers can infer 
the biconditional A if and only if B. Following Geis & Zwicky (1971), we will call this 
inference conditional perfection (sometimes simply perfection, since it is the only kind of 
perfection we will be concerned with).  
 
There is strong reason to think that perfection is not a purely logical inference—that is, it’s 
not an inference to be explained exclusively as a semantic entailment of conditional 
sentences.1 After all, theories of conditionals universally agree that If A, B does not entail 
If B, A (and that it does not entail A if and only if B). Moreover, there are many conditional 
statements and contexts that do not trigger perfection.   
 
(4) If this cactus grows native to Idaho, then it’s not an Astrophytum (Lilje 1972). 
                                                      
1 We will later consider a view on which conditional perfection does arise as a semantic entailment, but only 
when additional covert material is present. In other words, even at that point, we remain committed to the 
view that it is not a semantic entailment of the conditional. 
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(5) If you look at this Canaletto painting, you’ll get a good idea of what the Canal 
Grande looks like (Herburger 2015).  
 
It is natural, then, to explore the idea that perfection arises, when it does, from some kind 
of pragmatic reasoning. The sort of pragmatic reasoning in question seems to be 
systematic enough to be derivable from general pragmatic principles (that is without 
leveraging very specific assumptions about context).  
 
In this paper, we present a series of experiments designed to test one of the most 
promising pragmatic accounts of perfection. This is von Fintel’s (2001) idea that whether 
perfection arises depends on what kinds of questions are, implicitly or explicitly, driving 
the inquiry of the participants to the conversation (we present the essentials of von Fintel’s 
account in the next section). Because our findings will be mostly negative, we emphasize 
at the outset that von Fintel’s proposal is avowedly speculative. We are interested in 
testing it experimentally because it is a plausible working hypothesis. Even if it were not 
to be the whole story, it is worthwhile exploring which elements of it are supported by 
experimental scrutiny and which aren’t.  
 
Before proceeding to our main discussion, note that, while perfection is interesting in its 
own right as a problem for pragmatics, it has a wider significance. For instance, we believe 
that an account of conditional perfection might illuminate why participants in reasoning 
experiments are sometimes willing to endorse the fallacious inferences of Affirming the 
Consequent and Denying the Antecedent—the invalid cousins of Modus Ponens and Modus 
Tollens.2  Indeed, the connection between perfection and these forms of argument is at the 
center of our experiments.  
2. From implicatures to exhaustivity.   
 
Conditional perfection, we said, is not a purely logical inference. More generally, it seems 
wrong to maintain that it is the sort of inference that arises solely on the basis of the 
linguistic material that is explicitly made available by a conditional sentence. Geis & 
Zwicky (1971) illustrated the phenomenon of perfection with: 
 
(6) If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars. 
 
No doubt, they had in mind a context in which (6) conveys the information that mowing 
the lawn is the only way for the hearer to get the five dollars. But it’s easy to come up with 
                                                      
2 The connection between conditional perfection and the fallacies is already made in Geis & Zwicky (1971, 
p. 562). For reviews of the experimental findings concerning the conditional fallacies see Evans and Over 
(2004, chap. 3) and Oaksford and Chater (2007, chap. 5). For a proposal about how to account for the findings, 
given a story about perfection, see Cariani and Rips (forthcoming).  
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contexts in which this is not true. For instance, imagine (6) being uttered immediately 
after: 
 
(7)  If you tidy your room, I will give you five dollars.  
 
In this case, perfection seems blocked by a feature of the surrounding discourse. In 
general, linguistic context broadly understood can determine whether the inference is 
licensed or blocked. 
 
So, what features of context license perfection? There is a long history of controversial 
pragmatic analyses.3 Fast-forwarding to one of the later stages of this debate, Horn (2000) 
proposes a view that (with interpretational help from von Fintel 2001) we understand as 
follows: conditional perfection is licensed when If A, B is in Gricean competition with B, 
no matter what. By uttering If A, B, a cooperative speaker conveys her inability to make the 
stronger statement that B holds unconditionally (that is to assert: B, no matter what). That 
does license a hearer to infer something that goes beyond If A, B.  But, as von Fintel (2001) 
points out, that license is well short of perfection.  Even if one’s assertive utterance of If A, 
B signals reluctance to assert B, no matter what, it does not rule out another antecedent D, 
not equivalent to A, such that If D, B. So it does not imply that A is the only such antecedent 
(i.e., that A is necessary as well as sufficient for B).  
 
The exact upshot of Horn’s proposal depends on the background theory of conditionals. 
Let us adopt one theory as a starting point. Following a long tradition, we suppose that 
conditionals are universal quantifiers over a contextually set domain.4  
 
Strict: If A, B is true in context 𝐶	at world 𝑤 iff for all 𝑣 ∈ 𝐶 𝑤 , either A is false at 
v or B is true at 𝑣 
 
Here, 𝐶 ⋅  denotes a function from worlds to sets of worlds. Intuitively, this is interpreted 
as the set of worlds that are relevant to the evaluation of the conditional, given that the 
world of evaluation is w.   
 
Given this semantics, the most likely explanation for one’s not being in a position to assert 
B, no matter what would be that one believes that B might be false in some of the relevant 
worlds. But if the additional information conveyed by If A, B is just that B might be false 
in some salient possibility, we are far from perfection. Perfection would require not just 
that B fail at some of the relevant worlds at which A fails; it requires the truth of the 
obverse conditional (i.e., If B, A), and so it requires that every relevant B-world is an A-
world. Taking stock: Gricean competition between If A, B and B, no matter what seems to 
get at a real phenomenon. But that phenomenon is not perfection.   
                                                      
3 In addition to Geis & Zwicky (1971), see van der Auwera (1997), Horn (2000) and von Fintel (2001), 
4 In this paper, we are agnostic as to whether these truth-conditions are obtained by treating ‘If’ as a 
restrictor or as an operator. 
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Why, then, it is sometimes possible to get the full perfection inference?  Von Fintel (2001) 
sketches a different sort of pragmatic account, following an insight in Cornulier (1983). 
Commenting on the example, 
 
(8) One is allowed to sit in this seat if one is disabled or one is older than 70, 
 
Cornulier remarks: 
We can suppose, very roughly, that One is allowed to sit in this seat if one 
is disabled or one is older than 70 the word if keeps its merely sufficient 
condition meaning, and that the utterance situation suggests that if 
other sufficient conditions (allowing to sit there) did exist, they would 
have been mentioned, so that the only mentioned property (to be 
disabled or older than 70) is the only property which gives the right to 
sit there (presumption of exhaustivity). (Cornulier, 1983: 247)  
 
Incidentally, Cornulier’s example is especially interesting because it is a conditional 
permission, which might actually trigger a particularly strong form of perfection inference 
(our experiments did not target conditional permissions). 
 
Von Fintel’s (2001) central move is to connect Cornulier’s talk about exhaustivity with off-
the-shelf work on exhaustivity in response to questions (specifically Groenindijk & 
Stokhof, 1991; for a survey of work on exhaustivity see van Rooij and Schulz 2003). The 
key assumption here is that we generally, though not always, interpret simple answers to 
questions as exhaustive. If the doctor asks, “What did you drink last night?” and Lucy 
replies “Two glasses of wine”, we take Lucy to provide an exhaustive list of what she 
drank.  
 
This idea can be extended to conditionals. Consider a question Q such that (i) If A B is a 
possible answer to Q and (ii) when if A, B is provided as an answer to Q the conditional is 
naturally given an exhaustive interpretation.  There are many different questions 
conditionals might be used to answer. It will be useful to isolate two categories of 
questions: the first category consists of questions about how the consequent might come 
about. We call them consequent-directed (abbreviated [CONS?]).   Here are some examples 
of [CONS?] questions: 
 
• What are all the ways in which B? 
• How might B happen? 
• Is B true?  
 
The second category consists of questions about what follows from the antecedent. 
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• What follows from A? 
• What happens if A? 
 
To make this concrete, consider an example like (6). This might be an answer to [CONS?] 
questions like: “What are all the ways in which I might get five dollars?”, “Will I get five 
dollars?”; it might also be an answer to [ANT?] questions like “What happens if I mow 
the lawn?”.  Moreover, we should not suppose that these are the only questions: [CONS?] 
and [ANT?] questions are not exhaustive categories.   
 
Von Fintel’s claim is that [CONS?] questions, but not [ANT?] ones, might help yield 
something like perfection. In arguing for this claim, von Fintel starts, as we do, with the 
assumption that the truth-conditions for If A, B are captured by Strict.   
 
Here, then is one possible way of deriving perfection given the assumptions we have on 
the table. Suppose that a [CONS?] question Qcons was asked and that it was answered by If 
A, B. Then: 
 
Step 1: provided that If A, B is understood as an exhaustive answer to Qcons, the 
speaker is not in a position to assert If D, B for any D that competes with A.  
 
Step 2: provided that the speaker is informed about the truth-values of these 
conditionals, she must believe all conditionals of the form If D, B are false.   
 
Step 3: if all conditionals of the form If D, B are false for every antecedent that 
competes with A, then if not A, not B must be true.  
 
To justify the reasoning from Step 2 to Step 3 we need another assumption.  One approach 
would be to stipulate a principle to the effect that the space of competitors to A is 
particularly rich: 
 
Competitors: the antecedents that compete with A are all those antecedents D that 
do not entail A.  
 
This entails that there are lots of alternatives. In particular, it entails that for each not A-
world w, there is an alternative conditional (If  Sw , B) where Sw is a sentence that is only 
true in w.5  
 
Another way of justifying this step, a more plausible one in our view, is to assume (i) that 
conditionals satisfy the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) so that from ~(If 
                                                      
5 Concluding the reasoning: asserting If A, B would implicate ~(If  Sw , B), which entails that there is a world 
that verifies Sw  & ~B. But since only w verifies Sw , then w must verify ~B. Since w was an arbitrary world that 
does not verify A, it follows that every ~A-world is a ~B world.  
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D, B) one might infer If D, ~B and (ii) that every relevant possibility is included in some 
competitor or other. We think that this second approach fits best with the rest of von 
Fintel’s theoretical framework—as von Fintel’s (1997, section 7) argues that Strict truth-
conditions for If can be made compatible with CEM by hypothesizing that conditionals 
come with a homogeneity  presupposition.6  
 
Whatever the status of the Competitors assumption, von Fintel’s account predicts that 
conditional perfection should arise precisely when the other assumptions in the above 
reasoning are satisfied. We take Strict to be a valuable working hypothesis, so the key 
assumptions to focus on, as we move to the experimental part of our paper are (i) that 
there is some principled way in which the relevant competitors to A are generated; (ii) 
that If A, B is understood as an exhaustive answer to [CONS?] questions; and (iii) that the 
speaker is relevantly informed.  
3. Designing experimental tests of perfection inferences.  
 
Before going through the battery of experiments we ran, it’s useful to describe informally 
how we set about experimenting with perfection. There are many decisions to be made in 
setting up such an experiment, and small variants might result in significant changes.  
 
One guiding idea that motivated us from the outset is that if perfection arises, we should 
see unusually high endorsement rates for the two conditional fallacies of Affirming the 
Consequent (AC) and Denying the Antecedent (DA).  
 
(AC) B, If A, B. Therefore: A 
(DA)  not A, If A, B. Therefore: not B.  
 
The idea here is that if, in context, If A, B conveys If B, A then, barring interference, the 
endorsement rate for AC should approach the endorsement rate for Modus Ponens. 
Similarly, if If A, B conveys If not A, not B, then DA should also approach Modus Ponens.  
 
We have chosen to test endorsement rates for conditional inferences partly because we 
could rely on established and very robust data concerning people’s endorsement of these 
patterns.  Figure 1 summarizes endorsement rates for MP, MT, AC, and DA. Incidentally, 
                                                      
6 Of course, the canonical way of validating CEM is to adopt Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals (Stalnaker 
1968, 1981): If A, B is true at w iff B is true at the selected A-world. Yet another option, one that we have some 
stake in, starts with the argument in Cariani & Santorio (forthcoming) that will is a ‘selectional’ modal (that 
its contribution is to select a world out of a modal base). They note that combining a restrictor semantics in 
the style of Kratzer (1991, 2012) with selectional modals gives something roughly like Stalnaker’s semantics 
for conditionals of the form If A, will B—specifically, a semantics that validates CEM.  One might extend this 
insight to a broader class of conditional sentences by postulating that conditionals can sometimes restrict 
covert selectional modals (this would replace the current default hypothesis, according to which, absent overt 
modals, conditional antecedents restrict covert necessity modals).  
 
Experimenting with (Conditional) Perfection / 7 
it reveals one of the important discoveries in the psychology of reasoning: The 
endorsement rate of Modus Ponens is higher than the endorsement rate of Modus Tollens 




We could have chosen a different approach had we decided to test whether people 
endorse the inference from If A, B to If not A, not B. While our data are primarily of the 
multi-premise kind (the kind we described in the previous couple paragraphs), we 
recognize both kinds of data as significant to an account of conditional perfection (see, 
e.g., Fillenbaum, 1978, for an experiment of this latter sort).8  
 
                                                      
7 See the references mentioned in Note 2 for reviews of this evidence. For the specific studies from which these 
results come, see Evans, Newstead, and Byrne (1993, Table 2.4). Recall that our approach is to test the 
endorsement rates of AC and DA. When perfection is triggered, these inferences aren’t fallacies at all, but 
actually valid applications of modus ponens or modus tollens. Thus, when we think about, say, AC, there are 
two possibilities that might lead to different endorsement rates: 
i. people infer from If A, B to If B, A and then apply MP to If B, A and B. 
ii. people infer from If A, B to If not A, not B and then apply MT to If not A, not B and B.  
This difference might matter to our project and we should be mindful of it in interpreting our results.  
 
8 We have, however, done some preliminary experiments of the latter kind as well. Though we will not 
formally discuss them here, they did not suggest different picture from what came out of the multi-premise 
experiments. 



















Figure 1. Standard endorsement rates for the  four inference patterns modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), affirming the 
consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da) across previous experiments (data from Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993, 
Table 2.4 and are weighted averages from seven earlier experiments). 
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We note that psychological research provides many examples in which college-aged 
participants endorse AC and DA at rates greater than those that appear in Figure 1. The 
Figure 1 experiments used conditionals for which people do not have strong beliefs in the 
necessity of the antecedent for the consequent. A typical conditional in such experiments 
might be If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test, where participants’ 
previous beliefs do not suggest that John’s understanding of Chapter 5 is necessary for his 
doing well. (Perhaps John could do well simply by bribing his instructor.) But if prior 
beliefs do suggest (causal) necessity, participants find AC and DA more congenial (e.g., 
Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Marcus & Rips, 1979; Staudenmayer, 1975; 
Thompson, 1994). For example, a conditional like If the butter is heated, then it melts accords 
with people’s belief that heating is both necessary and sufficient for the butter melting. 
It’s difficult to think of other ways to melt butter aside from heating it. So an AC or DA 
argument with such a conditional appears correct to many participants (e.g., If the butter 
is heated, then it melts; the butter melts; therefore, the butter was heated). Effects of this sort are 
similar to those of conditional perfection in that they encourage a reading like that of A iff 
B, but they arise for reasons other than the pragmatic considerations that we have 
discussed so far. Because our intent in these experiments is to test the pragmatic account 
of Section 2, we chose conditionals with antecedents that don’t already suggest necessity 
(e.g., conditionals like the one about John doing well rather than the one about butter 
melting).  
 
A more pertinent set of studies have examined conditional promises (e.g., (6)-(7)) and 
threats (e.g., If you continue to disrupt the class, you’ll have to leave the room). These studies 
have shown greater acceptance of AC and DA for promises and threats than for ordinary 
indicatives (e.g., If there is an electrical failure, school will be closed, Markovits & Lesage, 1990; 
If the student is doing economics then he is a socialist, Newstead, Ellis, Evans, & Dennis, 1997). 
Similarly, participants are more willing to accept the inference from If A, B to If not A, not 
B under the same circumstances (Fillenbaum, 1978). The goal of a promise or threat is 
usually to get the addressee to perform some action (e.g., mow the lawn) or to refrain from 
one (disrupting the class). In order for these speech acts to be effective, speakers 
presumably intend not to provide the promised reward if the action is not taken and not 
to carry out the threatened punishment if the infraction is not committed. These 
presumptions can be overridden in the right circumstances, as we’ve already noted in 
Section 2. But by default, promises and threats convey an exhaustive interpretation, as the 
experiments we’ve just cited suggest. Our aim in the present experiments is to manipulate 
participants’ impression of exhaustivity by means of [CONS?] questions, so we picked 
conditionals for our experiments that (unlike promises and threats) don’t by themselves 
convey exhaustivity.  
 
The second guiding idea in shaping our experimental tasks was that we needed to create 
matched items. One version of each item used [CONS?] questions. In the other version, 
we either used no question at all, or we used [ANT?] questions—depending on the 
experiment. We will call this variable question type in what follows.  An example of one of 
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our [CONS?] items was the following (the exact wording differed across experiments, as 
we will clarify in the next section): 
 
John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
[You ask Mary, “Did John do well on the test?"]  
Mary says, "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test."  
Assume that Mary's response is true and that John did well on the test.  
Given this information, then, does Mary’s statement imply that John understood 
Chapter 5? 
 
When the [CONS?] question was a polar question (i.e., a yes/no question), the matching 
item did not have a question at all (so it is simply the result of removing the bit in square 
brackets).  
 
Other experiments involved more complicated [CONS?] questions, such as for example: 
 
 You ask Mary, “What are all the ways John could manage to do well on the test?” 
 
In these cases, the matching item replaced the line in which we asked the [CONS?] 
question with a line in which we asked the [ANT?] question:   
 
You ask Mary, "What are all the things that would happen in case John 
understood Chapter 5?"   
 
Note also that the sample item above is testing for Affirming the Consequent. For each 
vignette (there were 16 of them), we had four items that tested for Modus Ponens, Tollens, 
Affirming the Consequent, and Denying the Antecedent.  
 
In total, this means that we associated each vignette with eight possible items (four 
inferences for each of the two possible questions). Participants saw only one item based 
on a particular vignette. In discussing the experiments, we will refer to this distribution 
of items (16 vignettes, four inference types, and two question types) as a standard set. 
Participants saw the vignettes presented one-at-a-time on a computer screen, in a new 
random order for each participant. They responded by clicking on one of two options 
(e.g., “implies” vs. “does not imply”). Participants were college students enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course, and they completed the experiment as part of a course 
requirement. No participant took part in more than one experiment. 
 
Note that the [CONS?] question “What are all the ways in which B?” is less natural than 
other possible [CONS?] questions, such as “How might B happen?” or “Under what 
conditions would B happen?”. In most of our experiments, we have privileged the more 
cumbersome question because it reduces the permissibility of partial (aka mention-some) 
answers. Consider the question: 
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(9) Q: Where can I buy Stephen King novels? 
A:  At Powell’s Books.  
 
In (9), we do not expect the answer to be an exhaustive catalog of the places where the 
questioner can buy Stephen King novels. The reason it is important to avoid this 
interpretation is that the account of conditional perfection we sketched in the previous 
section breaks down if the answer is understood to be partial.  
 
To have a better chance of ruling out mention-some answers (that is: for the question to set 
up the presumption that any answer would be exhaustive), we might ask a different sort 
of question, such as:9 
 
(10) Q: What are all the places where I can buy Stephen King novels? 
A:  At Powell’s Books.  
 
This is why most of our experiments use “What are all the ways in which B?” as the 
[CONS?] question.  
 
While this is a good reason to run experimental tests with the more artificial phrasing, it 
is not a good reason not to test the more natural [CONS?] questions. It is for this reason 
that our leading experiment involves a simple polar question, as in our initial example 
above (in which “you” ask Mary, “Did John do well on the test?”).10 
4. The sequence of experiments.  
 
A quest for perfection drives the experiments we report here. In each of them, we present 
participants with a series of problems, variations on the standard set that we described 
earlier. These problems vary the inference type (Modus Ponens, Tollens, Affirming the 
Consequent, and Denying the Antecedent) and question type ([CONS?] and [ANT?]) in 
the hope that a demand for an exhaustive set of reasons for the consequent—[CONS?] but 
not [ANT?]—will lead participants to perfect the conditional. According to the von Fintel-
style hypothesis, perfection should be manifested by increased endorsement of the 
“fallacies,” Denying the Antecedent and Affirming the Consequent. As we’ve mentioned, 
these arguments switch from invalid to valid under a perfected conditional, which should 
                                                      
9 Perhaps, even the question in (10) might, in certain circumstances, permit a mention-some answer. We discuss 
the implications of this point for our project in Section 5 below.   
10 Note that the reason why we did not use an [ANT?] question as a comparison in this case is that it does 
not seem plausible to target the antecedent with one such question (say, “Did John understand Chapter 5?”). 
Except for some recherché contexts, the conditional "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the 
test" is not an acceptable answer to the question: “Did John understand Chapter 5?”.  
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increase the likelihood that participants will accept them. The same manipulation, 
however, should have only a weak effect, if any, on the endorsement of Modus Ponens 
and Modus Tollens, since these inferences are already valid under the “unperfected” 
reading of the conditional. This, then, is the perfection pattern of our quest: Greater 
endorsement of Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent under [CONS?] 
questions but not [ANT?] questions, but little change in endorsement of Modus Ponens 
and Modus Tollens. 
 
Experiment 1: Polar Questions 
 
We start here with one of the simplest examples we ran.11 As described in the previous 
section, this experiment straightforwardly contrasted a polar [CONS?] question with the 
same item with the question removed. 
 
John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
[You ask Mary, “Did John do well on the test?"]  
Mary says, "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test."  
Assume that John did not do well on the test.  
Given this information, does Mary’s statement imply that John did not 
understand Chapter 5?  
 
The proportion of “yes” responses, based on 32 participants, showed however no 
difference between the [CONS?] question and no question at all. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
we did find the typical decrease in endorsements as a function of inference type, 
F(3,504) = 17.67, p < .001. As the figure suggests, however, we found no reliable overall 
difference due to the [CONS?] question (F(1,504) < 1), and no differential effect of the 
[CONS?] question on the rate of endorsement for the individual inference types 
(F(3,504) < 1).12 
                                                      
11 Although we lead with this experiment, it is not temporally the first experiment we ran. It was suggested 
to us by Kai von Fintel as a simplification of some later experiments.  
12 The statistical tests in this and the following experiments are based on a generalized linear mixed model 
for binomial data. Participants and vignettes are random effects in these analyses. The analyses used the 
Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 2. The effect of polar question vs. no question on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 2: Explicit Demands for Exhaustive Answers 
 
Experiment 2 involved the more complicated [CONS?] questions, ones that attempt to 
emphasize the demand for exhaustivity in the question to Mary: 
  
 John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
You ask Mary, "What are all the ways John could manage to do well on the test?"  
 Mary responds, "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test."  
 Assume that John did well on the test.  
Given this information, does Mary's statement then imply that John understood 
Chapter 5? 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the [CONS?] question was intended to make mention-some 
answers as impermissible as possible. The [ANT?] question was also introduced to make 
[ANT?] items parallel to the [CONS?] items, controlling for the length and complexity of 
the vignettes. Specifically, in the “Chapter 5” case, we used the [ANT?] question: "What 
are all the things that could happen in case John understood Chapter 5?".  
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None of these changes, however, led our participants to perfect the conditionals. Figure 3 
graphs the data from 32 participants and shows the usual decrease in endorsement rates 
from Modus Ponens to Tollens to Affirming the Consequent to Denying the Antecedent, 
F(3,504) = 20.34, p < .001. We also found a marginal difference favoring problems with 
[CONS?] over those with [ANS?] (F(1,504) = 3.16, p = .076), but no significant difference 
appeared in the shape of these two functions, F(3,504) < 1. That is, we did not find that 
demands for an exhaustive answer to how the consequent could come about elevated 
Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent to a greater extent than it did 
Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens.  
 
 
Experiment 3: Checks for Memory for the Questions 
 
Could it be that our participants were ignoring the question? After all, one could perform 
the task while skipping the question “you” are asking Mary and reading just the 
conditional and the minor premise. If that was happening, it would explain our difficulty 
in obtaining the perfection pattern.   
 




















What are all the ways that [consequent] 
could come about?
What are all the things that could happen
in case [antecedent]?
Figure 3. The effect of [CONS?] versus [ANT?] questions on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 2. 
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To follow this line of inquiry, we ran a version of Experiment 2 with an additional twist. 
After answering each item, participants viewed a new screen that prompted them to recall 
which question, [CONS?] or [ANT?], they had seen earlier, and they picked one of them 
by clicking on it. For the sample vignette, the choice was between “What are all the ways 
John could manage to do well on the test?” and “What are all the things that could happen 
in case John understood Chapter 5?” If participants could not remember what question 
had been asked, we inferred that the question did not play a role in their reasoning. And 
even though one might imagine that they could correctly recognize the question without 
using it in reasoning, a correct answer would at least suggest that the question was 
available for them to reason with.  In addition, since participants saw multiple items, this 
forced choice encouraged them to attend to the question as they were working through 
the later items in their allotted sequence.  
 
Alas, the results did not fit the perfection pattern. Figure 4 plots the proportion of 
endorsements from 33 participants after we removed all trials on which the participants 
made a memory error (i.e., selected the [CONS?] question when they had actually seen 
[ANT?] or the reverse error). These errors ranged from 9% to 18% across the eight 
conditions shown in the figure. As the figure suggests, we found the usual effect of 
inference types, F(3,452) = 13.75, p < .001. But neither the effect of the question nor the 
interaction between the question and the inference types was statistically reliable (both 
F’s < 1). 
 
Given the above results, one might become quite skeptical. Either there is a problem in 
the theoretical proposal or in the particular way we had sought to test it.  




















What are all the things that could happen
in case [antecedent]?
What are all the ways that [consequent] 
could come about?
Figure 4. The effect of [CONS?] versus [ANT?] questions on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 3, with memory checks. 
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Experiment 4: Explicit Specification of the Antecedent as the Only Condition 
 
Experiment 3 showed that people generally recalled the questions. Even tossing out the 
cases in which they didn’t, did not make a difference to the resulting pattern of judgments. 
Are there cases where we do get the perfection pattern using a similar experimental set 
up? The next idea, then, was to get very close to forcing a biconditional reading by 
semantic means. In the items for the new experiment, Mary does not just answer the 
question with the conditional: she adds what basically amounts to biconditional 
information (to make things easier, we underlined the new bit below: it was not 
underlined in the original stimuli).  
 
John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
You ask Mary, "What are all the ways John could manage to do well on the test?"  
Mary responds, "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test. 
That is the ONLY way John could have done well on the test."  
Assume that John did well on the test.  
Given this information, does Mary's statement imply that John understood 
Chapter 5? 
 
In the [ANT?] variant, in addition to the usual difference in question (i.e., “What are all 
the things that could happen in case John understood Chapter 5?”), Mary’s response 
changes to: 
 
Mary responds, "If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test. 
That is the ONLY thing that could have happened if John understood Chapter 5."  
 
Note that the continuation in these [ANT?] variants does not go any distance towards 
conveying biconditional information (for it does not rule out that John’s doing well on the 
test might have come about by some other means). 
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Figure 5. The effect of [CONS?] versus [ANT?] questions on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 4, with explicit indication of exhaustivity. 
 
At last, these explicit changes did yield a perfection pattern, as shown in Figure 5 (based 
on 32 participants).  Not only did we find a significant effect of inference type 
(F(3,504) = 6.29, p < .001), we also found a significant effect of question type 
(F(1,504) = 22.65, p < .001), and crucially an interaction of the two (F(3,504) = 10.85, 
p < .001). This last effect is the perfection result, apparent in the difference in the shape of 
the curves in the figure.  
 
Essentially, if we explicitly provide the strengthenings that are supposed to be conveyed 
by pragmatic means, we get precisely the pattern we would expect. This suggests that our 
procedure is sensitive to (at least some kinds of) information that can get participants to 
interpret a conditional as a biconditional.  
 
 
Experiment 5: Speaker’s Knowledge of the Answers and Willingness to Relate Them 
 
The biconditional interpretation (predictably) arises if we have an explicit continuation 
with only, as in Experiment 4. So why were we unable to find a similar pattern in 
Experiments 1-3?  We have already attempted to rule out the possibilities that the 
questions were not sufficiently clear in their demand for an exhaustive answer and that 
participants were inattentive to the questions. One further possibility is that we have not 
completely eliminated a “mention some” answer. Although our [CONS?] question asks 
Mary for all the ways the consequent could come about, her response may reflect only her 



















What are all the ways that [consequent] could
come about? [Antecedent] is the ONLY way.
What are all the things that could happen
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partial knowledge of these ways or her limited willingness to produce them. Participants 
may have interpreted Mary’s statement in a way that allows for these constraints, and if 
so, they may have doubted whether her answer does indeed convey all the ways the 
consequent could happen.  
To encourage participants to think that Mary’s response was exhaustive, we tried 
“loading up” the context. The items in Experiment 5 looked like this (we underlined the 
new bit; it was not underlined in the text that participants saw): 
John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
You ask Mary, "What are all the ways John could manage to do well on the test?"  
In fact, Mary knows all the ways and is willing to relate them. Mary responds, "If 
John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the test."  
Assume that John did well on the test.  
Given this information, does Mary's statement imply that John understood 
Chapter 5? 
 
The same underlined information was also inserted in the [ANT?] version of the problem.  
We expected that stipulating that Mary knows all the ways in which John might do well 
on the test and is willing to relate them would have a similar effect to saying explicitly 
that [Consequent] is the ONLY thing that could happen.  
This expectation turned out to be (only) partially vindicated by our findings.  
 
Figure 6.  The effect of [CONS?] versus [ANT?] questions on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 5, with information about speaker’s 
knowledge and willingness. 




















What are all the ways that [consequent] 
could come about? [Speaker knows and is
willing to say.]
What are all the things that could happen
in case [antecedent]? [Speaker knows and is
willing to say.]
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Endorsement rates for the four inference types again differed significantly 
(F(3,504) = 15.47, p < .001), based on data from 32 participants. But this time, the results 
show that the [CONS?] question alters this typical pattern by elevating endorsement rates 
for Denying the Antecedent. Although neither the overall difference between questions 
(F(1,504) < 1) nor the interaction between question and inference type (F(3,504) = 1.59, 
p = .19) are significant, there is a significant difference between questions for Denying the 
Antecedent, F(1,504) = 5.70, p = .02. By contrast, the [CONS?] question did not affect 
endorsement rates for Affirming the Consequent (F(1,504) < 1). Note, too, that even for 
Denying the Antecedent, the boost in endorsement rates, though significant, is smaller 
than what we have seen in the full-blown perfection of Experiment 4. 
 
Experiment 6: Explicit Specification of Exhaustiveness 
Once participants know that the speaker of a conditional is (a) under explicit pressure to 
produce an exhaustive answer to the question of how the consequent could come about, 
and (b) knows all the ways it could come about and is willing to relate them, they produce 
a weak perfection pattern. The weakness of this result may be due to a residual 
unwillingness on the participants’ part to believe that the speaker really has produced all 
the ways. Although Mary may know all the ways and is willing to tell you about them, 
she may nevertheless give you just a sample, perhaps because the list is too long, too 
complex, or too unrelated to present concerns. These considerations suggest that we might 
be able to reinstate full perfection if Mary explicitly states that she is in fact giving all the 
ways when she asserts the conditional.   
To check this prediction, we used the vignettes from Experiment 5, but added Mary’s 
assertion that she was giving all the ways the consequent could come about: 
John has taken a test on Chapters 4-6 that has not been graded yet.  
You ask Mary, "What are all the ways John could manage to do well on the test?"  
In fact, Mary knows all the ways and is willing to relate them. Mary responds, 
"Here are ALL of them: If John understood Chapter 5, then John did well on the 
test."  
Assume that John did well on the test.  
Given this information, does Mary's statement imply that John understood 
Chapter 5? 
 
The corresponding [ANT?] version likewise included the “Here are ALL of them” prefix 
in Mary’s answer. 
The results from 32 participants appear in Figure 7 and show that the new “ALL of them” 
clause was sufficient to produce the perfected interpretation. 
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Figure 7. The effect of [CONS?] versus [ANT?] questions on endorsement of modus ponens (mp), modus tollens (mt), 
affirming the consequent (ac), and denying the antecedent (da), Experiment 6, with explicit exhaustivity. 
When the speaker was asked to give all the ways the consequent could occur, and the 
speaker then made it clear that she was providing all the ways, participants were likely to 
endorse each of the inference types.  When the speaker was asked about all the things that 
could happen if the antecedent occurred, however, we find the typical decreasing pattern 
across inference types. This produced significant effects of inference type (F(3, 520) = 14.58, 
p < .001), question type (F(1,520) = 10.43, p = .001), and an interaction between the two 
(F(3,520) = 6.73, p < .001). Unlike the results of Experiment 5, the difference due to the 
question is significant for both Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent 
(F(1,520) = 23.09, p < .001 for Affirming the Consequent, and F(1,520) = 11.55, p < .001 for 
Denying the Antecedent). 
 
5. Theoretical Discussion 
The positive results in Experiments 4 and 6 suggest that true conditional perfection can, 
in fact, be linked to exhaustivity. However, the negative results in Experiments 1-3, and 
to some extent even in Experiment 5, require us to put this finding in perspective.   
Specifically, a common assumption is that a strong relationship exists between questions 
and exhaustivity. This relationship includes at least the idea that some overt questions 
trigger exhaustive readings in conditionals. The experimental evidence we have 
considered suggests that this is not quite right. In order to trigger exhaustive readings of 
conditionals, we need more than just questions.  
Experiment 6:



















What are all the ways that [consequent] 
could come about? Here are ALL of them.
What are all the things that could happen
in case [antecedent]? Here are ALL of them.
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In closing, we briefly consider how our experiments qualify the relation among questions, 
exhaustivity, and perfection. But first we consider a similar experiment that raises some 
of the same issues. 
5.1. Relation to a prior experiment 
There is some similarity between the question-variations we used in our experiments and 
an earlier experiment by Farr (2011). Farr gave her participants vignettes like this: 
Monika sells seafood on the market. She gets 1 euro for a crab, 2.50 euros for an 
eel, 15 euros for a lobster and 2.50 euros for a pike. Kerstin, an employee of Monika, 
cannot remember the prices. Since she does not want to ask Monika again, she asks 
Sahra, who also works for Monika. Sahra knows the prices exactly.  
At this point, in Farr’s experiment, there is a dialogue between Kerstin and Sahra. This 
dialogue starts with one of two questions: 
what-if-p  Kerstin: What happens if I sell an eel? 
when-q Kerstin: When do I get 2.50 euros? 
 Sahra: If you sell an eel, you get 2.50 euros. 
Participants are then asked:  
Did Sahra answer Kerstin’s question sufficiently? [Yes] [No]  
One thing we want to note here is that, despite the similarities in the setup, Farr’s 
experiment did not end up testing whether Sahra’s conditional gets perfected. Instead, it 
ended up testing for the related question of whether Kerstin’s question was answered 
“sufficiently.” One way in which this difference is potentially problematic is that, in the 
right context, a question might be answered sufficiently even if it gets just a partial, 
mention-some, answer. But in such a case, we have no way of telling whether the 
conditional has been perfected. The connection among question type, exhaustiveness of 
answers (in the case of conditionals), and perfection is the issue we explore in the rest of 
this article. 
5.2. How the Experiments Constrain Explanations of Perfection 
At first sight, our experiments appear to refute the idea that questions trigger perfection. 
Even explicit questions that demand exhaustive answers about the consequent (e.g., What 
are all the ways [the consequent] could come about?) don’t always yield a perfected conditional 
(antecedent iff consequent).  
According to the von Fintel/Cornulier account that we have been pursuing, questions 
about some event B set up the expectation that a conditional answer of the form If A, B 
implies that A is the only way B could come about. Thus, if ~A, ~B. Together, If A, B and If 
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~A, ~B, yield the perfected interpretation, A iff B. For example, questions like Did John do 
well on the test? or What are all the ways John could do well on the test? imply that the answer 
If John understood Chapter 5, then he did well on the test supplies all ways he could do well. 
So John did well if and only if John understood Chapter 5. Our experiments, however, 
failed to produce this pattern of reasoning. In principle, then, this failure could come about 
either (a) because participants failed to infer a perfected conditional from (what they 
perceived as) an exhaustive answer, or (b) because they failed to interpret the conditional 
as exhaustive, in the first place. Let’s consider these two possibilities in turn.     
5.2.1. Do people infer perfected conditionals from exhaustive answers?  
Perhaps our negative results are partial evidence that people do not reason from (i) to (ii): 
(i) For each alternative D to the antecedent A, ~ (If D, B) 
(ii) If ~A, ~B 
In the case of our experiments, failure to infer (ii) from (i) amounts to the idea that 
participants understood the antecedent (e.g., John understood Chapter 5) as the only way 
that the consequent (John did well on the test) could occur, and yet did not infer that if John 
did not understand Chapter 5, he did not do well.  
 
But on the contrary, Experiments 4 and 6 show that given discourse that basically entails 
claims of the form of (i), people will reason their way to a claim of the form of (ii).13 This 
suggests that the failure to find the perfection pattern in the remaining experiments is due 
to participants failing to interpret the conditional (e.g., If John understood Chapter 5, he did 
well on the test) as an exhaustive answer to the question (What are all the ways John could do 
well on the test?).  
 
To back up this possibility, we asked participants in a further experiment to decide 
whether the conditionals mentioned all the ways the consequent could come about.14 The 
experiment was very similar to Experiment 5 (in which Mary is said to know all the ways 
and is willing to relate them), but in addition to asking whether participants agreed with 
the inference, we also asked them, “Did Mary’s response mention all the ways?” (Half the 
participants answered the inference question first and half answered the “all the ways” 
question first, though the order had no statistically reliable effect on the results.) For 
[CONS?] questions (e.g., What are all the ways John could do well on the test?), participants 
believed that the conditional response (If John understood Chapter 5, he did well on the test) 
mentioned all the ways on only 14.5% of trials.   
 
                                                      
13 Note, incidentally, that if one rejects the Competitor assumption we sketched in Section 2, this would be 
indirect, and admittedly very defeasible, experimental evidence that people reason with something like 
Conditional Excluded Middle. 
14 We thank Bob Stalnaker for suggesting this experiment.  
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Of course, our results do not mean that questions never produce the presumption that a 
conditional answer is exhaustive. Rather, the results suggest that even very explicit 
questions of the proper sort don’t always trigger an exhaustive reading. Something more 
is needed to ensure it. 
 
5.2.2. Why don’t people believe conditional answers to questions are exhaustive? 
 
Questions don’t always yield exhaustive answers. Still, we might to be able to recover  the 
spirit of the Cornulier/von Fintel proposal on conditional perfection by supposing that 
questions yield exhaustive answers by default and giving an independent explanation for 
why this default pattern did not emerge in Experiments 1-3 and 5.  
 
Perhaps the explanation is that some property of the vignettes in these experiments 
encouraged a mention-some reading. Consider this dialogue: 
 
(11) Q: Who are all the people who came to the party? 
A:  John came.  
 
Even though the question is phrased as demanding a complete list, a possible mention-
some interpretation of the answer seems available. The respondent might be seen as simply 
rejecting the burden of providing a complete answer to the question and might volunteer 
instead whatever information she was able to provide (perhaps expecting that other 
conversational participants will be able to fill out the rest of the party-goers list). In the 
specific case of (11), this sort of interpretation might even be invited by the background 
knowledge that only extremely unusual parties have only one attendee. Similarly, it is 
possible that, when we ask, “What are all the ways in which [consequent] might come 
about?” the respondent’s answer is given a mention-some reading.15   
 
Though we do not think that this assessment is without merit, it has too many surprising 
consequences to be plausible. What we found is that, unless the respondent explicitly 
avows providing a complete answer, there is no significant pattern of perfection. Though 
there are slight increases in endorsement rates for the fallacies Affirming the Consequent 
and Denying the Antecedent in some experiments, they are typically not enough to meet 
standard significance thresholds. One might have expected that in the cases where a 
mention-all interpretation is possible but not mandated, we should have seen some 
participants reach for it. In Experiment 5 and in the experiment mentioned in the previous 
                                                      
15 Demands for exhaustive answers often call for memory searches that exceed people’s abilities, especially in 
the context of an on-going conversation. In such situations, speakers may be thrown back on a satisfactory 
answer that is informative, but partial. Hearers may likewise make allowances for this kind of satisficing by 
leaving open the possibility that the speaker’s answer is all she can come up with at the moment—that it is 
temporarily exhaustive, rather than exhaustive period. In the case of (11), for example, this interpretation is 
enhanced if the speaker indicates some hesitancy: “Well…John came.” Viewed in this way, what our results 
suggest is that this temporarily exhaustive reading is more available than one might have expected. 
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subsection, we even tried as much as possible to “load” up the context so as to invite a 
mention-all answer, but without much success. 16  This is especially striking because 
mention-all interpretations of answers to questions are not unusual. According to the 
received wisdom (see, for example, van Rooij & Schulz, 2003), they should be preferred 
unless they are contrary to expectations (as in (11)). More generally, much recent work on 
implicatures argues that the computation of implicatures happens by default (see e.g., 
Chierchia 2013).  
 
Of course, it is still possible that participants read the [CONS?] questions as having open-
ended answers that respondents were unlikely to answer exhaustively. In the case of our 
running example, participants may have taken the question, What are all the ways John could 
manage to do well on the test? as placing an impossible demand on the addressee, given the 
many ways John could do well (e.g., cheating, bribing the instructor, divine intervention, 
lucky guessing,…). However, some of the vignettes in our experiments were explicit in 
listing alternatives for the antecedent. For example, one of the vignettes began with the 
sentence Someone has put a fertilizer, either Easy-gro or Bloom-builder, on the plants. This was 
then followed by the [CONS?] question What are all the ways the plants could manage to grow 
quickly? and the conditional If Easy-gro was put on the plants, then the plants grew quickly. 
Although items like these are not completely immune to mention-some interpretations, 
they seem at least less open to these interpretations than those in which the alternatives 
are unspecified. The initial sentence seems to limit the relevant alternatives to just a few 
(in this case, Easy-gro or Bloom-builder); so the speaker of the conditional should find it 
less of a burden to provide an exhaustive list. However, a re-analysis of Experiment 1 
shows that participants were less likely to endorse the inferences for the items with 
explicitly-provided alternatives (68% “yes” responses) than for the remaining open items 
(81% “yes” responses), and there were no reliable differences among inference types with 
respect to this effect. 
 
It appears then that pragmatic reasoning based on background questions is not enough to 
trigger the relevant exhaustive readings. What turns out to be necessary—in our 
experiments, at least—is linguistic material that explicitly directs hearers towards an 
exhaustive interpretation.  
 
A very austere development of this idea would be to claim that the biconditional 
interpretation requires that such material always be explicitly represented. This amounts 
to the claim that there is no distinctive pragmatic phenomenon of conditional perfection. 
Biconditional interpretations arise as entailments when an utterance of If A, B is conjoined 
with additional claims that are strong enough to entail their converses. 
 
The immediate problem with this explanation is that several previous experiments have 
found evidence of perfection stemming from the conditional’s status as a promise or threat 
                                                      
16 Recall that in this case we obtained an increase in endorsement for DA. 
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(e.g., If you disrupt the class, you’ll have to leave the room). (See the sources cited in Section 3.) 
These conditionals don’t entail their obverses—they merely suggest them—so perfection 
is obtainable without explicit entailment of If ~A, ~B. What is the case is that questions, in 
particular, are not always enough to yield the obverse.17 
 
Here’s where we’ve got to: Questions that explicitly request exhaustive answers don’t 
seem sufficient to produce perfection. That’s the experimental finding. This seems to be 
because the answers aren’t read as exhaustive rather than because an exhaustive answer 
doesn’t yield perfection. Although it’s possible that the question-to-exhaustive-answer 
link is the normal case and something about our experimental materials militated against 
it, the usual suspects—the respondent’s lack of knowledge, uncooperativeness, and 
response burden—seem to be ruled out by the results. There may be some unusual 
suspects responsible for blocking the normal route to interpreting the answer as 
exhaustive, but what could these be? Instead, it seems more likely that an exhaustive 
interpretation of an answer requires more than just a question demanding one. This 
something more could be an explicit avowal that the response is exhaustive, but it seems 
likely that people could settle on exhaustive readings from weaker evidence, as in the case 
of promises and threats. Perhaps what listeners require is some reason to think that an 
exhaustive conditional answer is in the respondent’s interest. Otherwise, the listeners’ 
experience with their own communicative foibles may make them hesitant to think 
they’ve gotten the full story. 
                                                      
17 A more generous variant on this no-question-to-exhaustive-answer position would be to claim that 
perfection-like strengthening can happen even when there are no explicit exhaustification devices.  This 
goes in the general direction of Herburger’s (2015) “Whole Truth” account of conditional perfection. Her 
preliminary statement of the theory is: 
 
Conditional Perfection and upper-bounding inferences arise as logical entailments when a sentence 
S is silently conjoined with only S, resulting in the conjunction S and only S. S and only S is then 
taken to express ‘the truth and the whole truth’. (Herburger, 2015, p. 6) 
 
Note that Herburger strikes through ‘and only S’ to indicate the fact that it may not be pronounced. If it is 
possible to interpret utterances of If A, B as utterances of If A, B and only If A, B, then that’s when we should 
expect perfection inferences to arise. According to this intermediate take, perfection inferences can arise due 
to overt or covert exhaustification.  
 
This sort of approach is difficult to evaluate, experimentally at least, absent some systematic ideas about 
when we are allowed to supplement S with the silent and only S. Since it is part of the proposal that there are 
no systematic principles that connect which questions are made salient by the discourse and the availability 
of the strengthened interpretation, it is hard to see what such principles might look like.  
 
But perhaps a non-experimental argument is available. If perfection is achievable with overt exhaustification 
devices (as our experiments demonstrate), and if there is precedent for covert exhaustification, we should 
expect that nothing prevents an exhaustified interpretation of conditionals. The remaining question, once 
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